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Abstract
This report describes a framework for symbolic Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) model checking that supports the controlled generation of counterex-
ample paths. The framework uses concepts from program analysis, including
elementary blocks and transfer functions, in its structuring mechanism. Var-
ious LTL encoding schemes can be used within the framework, including the
classic Clarke-Grumberg-Hamaguchi encoding and the promise variable en-
coding of Rozier and Vardi. Controlled generation of counterexample paths is
supported through the use of reference states in cycles and global constraints.
Keywords: symbolic model checking; linear temporal logic; counterex-
amples
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Model checking is a technique that can be effective for analysing behaviour
models. It was pioneered by Clarke and Emerson [CE81] and independently
by Queille and Sifakis [QS82]. Although model checking can be effective,
it suffers from the state explosion problem. The state explosion problem
is a major obstacle in the scalability of model checking. Symbolic model
checking [McM92, BCM+92] mitigates the problem, allowing larger models
to be checked that were not feasible with explicit model checking. It relies
on binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [Bry86].
Associated with model checking is a temporal logic in which behavioural
properties of the model are specified. Of the standard temporal logics, com-
putation tree logic (CTL) [Eme81] is the easiest to model-check, since one
can work entirely with state formulas in the checking. However, CTL can-
not express many fairness properties. Systems such as NuSMV [NuS] add
the capability to specify fairness constraints separately. However, fairness
constraints are associated with the model, i.e., they are assumed rather than
checked.
Alternatively, linear temporal logic (LTL) [Pnu77] can be used. Most
fairness properties of interest are directly expressible in LTL. Although CTL
and LTL are incomparable, for practical purposes the expressiveness of LTL
is almost the same as CTL with fairness constraints. (The original symbolic
LTL model checker [BCM+92, CGH94] was implemented using a symbolic
CTL model checker with fairness constraints.) From a user’s perspective,
LTL seems to be more intuitive than CTL, at least for beginners. However,
known approaches to LTL model checking do require that path modalities
be encoded in a state setting (producing the so-called tableau).
There are many strategic decisions that must be made in symbolic LTL
model checking, including:
• how to encode LTL path modalities,
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• eager versus deferred reachability computation, and
• choosing an ordering for the BDD.
There is no known best strategy in model checking, and the choice of strategy
for a particular problem can have a dramatic effect on the resources required
for model checking. Some researchers, including Rozier and Vardi [RV11],
advocate running different strategies in parallel.
In many applications of model checking, counterexamples play a primary
role. For example, in safety analysis, hazardous situations often cannot be
eliminated completely [Per84]. In such a case, often one is interested in the
conditions that can lead to the hazardous situations in order to assess the
likelihood of their occurrence. These situations are represented by counterex-
amples in model checking, and in general one is interested in all cases that
lead to counterexamples.
In LTL model checking, a specification for a model is implicitly quantified
over all paths in the model, but is otherwise quantifier free. A counterexample
is a path in the model that violates the specification. However, when a user
wants to know all cases that lead to counterexamples, it does not necessarily
mean the user is interested in every single counterexample path. Instead, the
user is typically interested in a finite number of representative cases. The
cases of interest often depend on the domain of the problem.
Existing symbolic LTL model checkers typically search forward from a
set of initial counterexample states, using heuristics, for a counterexample
path (see, for example, the technique described in [CGMZ95] for generating
counterexamples in symbolic model checking with fairness constraints). This
puts the user at the mercy of an “unguided” search. Moreover, it is not clear
how one would use the heuristics to control the search in order to ignore
uninteresting variations.
A general framework for symbolic LTL model checking that addresses
the need for guided counterexample generation has been developed and is
presented in this report. The framework supports different strategies for
symbolic LTL model checking and is independent of the modelling notation.
To make the mapping back and forth between a specific notation and the
framework straightforward and accurate, established concepts from program
analysis are adopted and adapted into the framework.
The framework developed is intended to support the model checking of
asynchronous systems. Synchronous systems are viewed as special cases of
asynchronous systems. Elements of the framework include:
• guarded updates: a restricted form of Dijkstra’s guarded commands
[Dij75],
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• transfer functions: functions that transform sets of states based on the
conditions and effects of transitions, and
• elementary blocks: components of a model, each of which is executed
atomically.
• program counters: state variables that reflect execution states of threads.
A mechanism for directing the generation of counterexample paths has
been developed within the framework. A reference set of states is specified as
the starting point for the search for a counterexample path. An appropriate
cycle that goes through the reference set is searched for first. Once a cycle
is found, a prefix for the cycle is chosen. The prefix followed by an indefinite
repetition of the cycle produces a counterexample path. Global constraints
may also be specified to further control the search.
Chapter 2 describes elements of the framework in which symbolic LTL
model checking and counterexample generation using the proposed approach
are performed. Chapter 3 describes an algorithm for computing reachability
within the framework. Chapter 4 describes symbolic LTL model checking
using the framework. Chapter 5 describes the mechanism for controlling the
generation of counterexample paths.
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Chapter 2
Elements of the Framework
2.1 States and Guarded Updates
The framework assumes that the system being modelled is a finite state
transition system, thus there is a finite set V of state variables:
V = {v1, v2, ..., vn}, (2.1)
where type(vi) is a finite enumeration for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A state assigns each
state variable with a value from its type (vi ← di with di ∈ type(vi) for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ n): i.e., a state is a set of assignments where each state
variable is assigned exactly once. Thus, a state can be viewed as a set of
pairs {(v1, d1), (v2, d2), ..., (vn, dn)} (a relation and a function) or simply an
n-tuple (d1, d2, .., dn), with di ∈ type(vi) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the set S of
possible states is
S , type(v1)× type(v2)× ...× type(vn). (2.2)
In addition to states, a finite state transition system also has a finite set of
transitions between states. The set of transitions can be viewed as forming
a single monolithic transition relation. However, operationally, it is often
convenient to view transitions as updates to states.
The framework uses guarded updates which are restricted forms of guarded
commands [Dij75]. A guarded update is a pair (g, u) where guard g is a
propositional formula with simple equalities and u is a simple update. The
idea is a state s in which guard g holds can transition to a state t that is
the result of updating s with u. Thus a guarded update may be viewed as
representing a set of transitions.
A simple equality is of the form l = r where l is vi or l ∈ type(vi) and r ∈
type(vi) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A guard g holds in a state s (denoted s |= g) if,
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by replacing occurrences of state variables in g with their assigned values in s,
g evaluates to true. The evaluation is performed using simple equality checks
and propositional calculus. As an example, the following is the evaluation of
g ≡ v1 = a1 ∨ v2 = b3 in the state s = {v1 ← a2, v2 ← b3, v3 ← c1} where
type(v1) = {a1, a2}, type(v2) = {b1, b2, b3, b4}, and type(v3) = {c1, c2}:
g ≡ v1 = a1 ∨ v2 = b3
≡ a2 = a1 ∨ b3 = b3 (substituting variables with values assigned in s)
≡ false ∨ true (evaluating equalities)
≡ true (propositional calculus).
A simple update u assigns a subset of the state variables with values in
their types, i.e., each state variable is at most assigned once. Like a state, an
update can be viewed as a relation or a function. Unlike a state, however,
not all state variables need to be assigned, i.e., the relation or function need
not be total. The state variables that are not assigned retain their values
from before the update (they are unchanged by the update). The result of
an update u on a state s is written s⊕ u and is defined as follows:
s⊕ u , {v ← d ∣∣ (v ← d) ∈ u ∨ (v ← d) ∈ s ∧ ¬(∃e : (v ← e) ∈ u)} (2.3)
i.e., ⊕ is the override operator if we treat s and u as relations. As an example,
if s = {v1 ← a, v2 ← b, v3 ← c} and u = {v1 ← d, v3 ← e}, then s ⊕ u =
{v1 ← d, v2 ← b, v3 ← e}.
A guarded update (g, u) transforms a set of states I to a set of states
O = f(g,u)(I), where f(g,u) is defined as follows:
f(g,u)(I) , {s⊕ u | s ∈ I ∧ (s |= g)}. (2.4)
The function f(g,u) is called the forward transfer function for the guarded
update (g, u). A guarded update (g, u) also has a reverse transfer function
r(g,u) defined as follows:
r(g,u)(O) , {s | (s⊕ u) ∈ O ∧ (s |= g)}. (2.5)
There is a transition relation R(g,u) associated with the guarded update (g, u):
R(g,u) , {(s, t) | (s |= g) ∧ t = s⊕ u}. (2.6)
The forward transfer function f(g,u) and the reverse transfer function r(g,u)
respectively compute the image and pre-image under R(g,u):
f(g,u)(I) = {t | (s, t) ∈ R(g,u) ∧ s ∈ I},
r(g,u)(O) = {s | (s, t) ∈ R(g,u) ∧ t ∈ O}.
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Although guarded updates seem overly restrictive, for a finite state tran-
sition system, an arbitrary atomic guarded command can always be encoded
as a finite collection of guarded updates. The use of guarded updates simply
makes the cases of an atomic guarded command more explicit.
2.2 Elementary Blocks
The concept of elementary blocks — taken from the field of program flow
analysis [NNH99] — plays a central role in the framework. Elementary blocks
are used in the framework to maintain structures from the source notation.
In addition to providing a straightforward bidirectional mapping between
objects in the source notation and objects in the framework, elementary
blocks allow analyses to take advantage of the structures inherited from the
source notation (some of which may be lost had the source notation been
translated into a Kripke structure). The use of elementary blocks and transfer
functions reflects the view that model checking is a special case of program
analysis.
Associated with an elementary block is a finite collection of guarded up-
dates. A transition through an elementary block means one of the guarded
updates is chosen. The framework requires that the collection of guarded
updates for an elementary block gives rise to a deterministic choice (thus the
guards must be mutually exclusive).
Because each guarded update represents a choice, the forward transfer
function fb for an elementary block b is defined as follows:
fb(I) ,
⋃
(g,u)∈GU(b)
f(g,u)(I) (2.7)
where GU(b) is the set of guarded updates for block b. Similarly, the reverse
transfer function rb is defined as follows:
rb(O) ,
⋃
(g,u)∈GU(b)
r(g,u)(O). (2.8)
A system is modelled as a finite collection of elementary blocks where
each elementary block represents a transition choice. Whereas the collection
of guarded updates for an elementary block gives rise to a deterministic
choice, the collection of elementary blocks for a system may give rise to a
non-deterministic choice. In addition, multiple elementary blocks may be
synchronised to “execute” in parallel (i.e., multiple elementary blocks are
chosen), in which case the guarded updates of the elementary blocks must
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be consistent, in that the guarded update chosen in a transition must be
the same in all the elementary blocks chosen for the transition. The forward
transfer function for a system modelled as a set of elementary blocks B is
defined as follows:
fB(I) ,
⋃
b∈B
fb(I). (2.9)
Similarly, the reverse transfer function for the system is defined as follows:
rB(O) ,
⋃
b∈B
rb(O). (2.10)
Although the framework adopts the concept of elementary blocks from
program analysis, it does not also adopt the static control flow graph of
program analysis, since a finer concept of flows possibly involving multiple
threads is needed. Instead, the framework uses program counters (PCs) to
represent states of thread executions, with each thread having its own PC.
Each elementary block belongs to a specific thread, and thus has a specific
PC-value pair specifying the value of the thread’s PC at the entrance to the
elementary block.
PC1=1
N1
Lock
[unset]
?PC1=2
N2
Light
[amber]
9
XXXXXzPC2=1
N3 Lock
???unset???
N4 Lock
[set]
PC1=3
PC3=1 spawns two subthreads
N8 Lock
???unset???
N9 Lock
[set]
? ?PC2=2
N5 Light
[green]
PC3=2
N10 Light
[red]
? ?PC2=3
N6 Lock
[unset]
PC3=3
N11 Lock
[unset]
? ?PC2=4
N7 Light
∧
[amber]
PC3=4
N12 Light
∧
[amber] revert to N2
Figure 2.1: A BT Example
Figure 2.1 shows an example in the form of a Behavior Tree (BT) [Dro03,
Dro06], that is used to illustrate the concepts. Each BT node that is not in
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Equality/Assignment Encoding
v1 = a1 / v1 ← a1 ¬v10
v1 = a2 / v1 ← a2 v10
v2 = b1 / v2 ← b1 ¬v20 ∧ ¬v21
v2 = b2 / v2 ← b2 v20 ∧ ¬v21
v2 = b3 / v2 ← b3 ¬v20 ∧ v21
v2 = b4 / v2 ← b4 v20 ∧ v21
v3 = c1 / v3 ← c1 ¬v30
v3 = c2 / v3 ← c2 v30
Table 2.1: Encoding equalities/assignments using BDD variables
an atomic composition becomes an individual elementary block. An atomic
composition (e.g., that involving BT nodes tagged N3 and N4) becomes a
single elementary block.
There are 3 threads in the BT example, thus 3 PCs are used. The choice
of PC names (PC1, PC2 and PC3) and the assignment of PC values (e.g.,
PC1=1 at the entrance of the elementary block for N1) are somewhat arbi-
trary. What is important is that different points in a thread execution path
are assigned different values. The use of PCs in encoding parallel processes is
common and dates as far back as 1978 in a paper by Flon and Suzuki [FS78].
2.3 Use of BDDs
In a symbolic approach, an expression characterises a set of values that de-
pends on the domain of the problem. For example, if x is of a type that is a
subset of the integers, then x+ 1 characterises a set of integers. In symbolic
model checking, the domain is a set of states and propositions are used to
characterise sets of states. Propositional operations replace set operations:
logical disjunctions replace set unions and logical conjunctions replace set
intersections.
The use of binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [Bry86] to represent propo-
sitions and speed up propositional operations is common in symbolic model
checking (see, e.g., [BCM+92]). If no inference mechanism (e.g., equational
reasoning) other than propositional reasoning is used for non-temporal rea-
soning, then equalities and assignments in guarded updates must be en-
coded using BDD variables. The equalities and assignments in the exam-
ple in Section 2.1 might be encoded as in Table 2.1. The encoding for
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g ≡ v1 = a1 ∨ v2 = b3 would be
g ≡ v1 = a1 ∨ v2 = b3
≡ ¬v10 ∨ ¬v20 ∧ v21.
For updates, the encodings represent post conditions that hold after the up-
dates. For convenience, an update is represented as a sequence. For example,
if u = {v2 ← b2} then v20 ∧ ¬v21 holds after the update u is applied, and u
is represented as a sequence: u = 〈v20 ← true, v21 ← false〉. The function
that produces the post condition for an update is defined as follows:
post(〈v ← true〉_ u) ≡ v ∧ post(u),
post(〈v ← false〉_ u) ≡ ¬v ∧ post(u),
post(〈〉) ≡ true
where _ is the sequence append operation. The rest of this report assumes
that non-temporal reasoning in model checking uses only BDDs, thus equal-
ities and assignments are translated based on their BDD encodings.
Transfer functions operate on propositions rather than sets. Thus, the
definition of the forward transfer function for a guarded update (g, u) in (2.4)
is replaced by:
f(g,u)(I) , (I ∧ g)⊕ u (2.11)
where I is a proposition that characterises a set of states and ⊕ is now a
symbolic override operation. The correctness of (2.11) is easy to see: (I ∧ g)
characterises the set {s | s ∈ I ∧ s |= g}.
The post condition holds after a transition through the guarded update,
thus
f(g,u)(I)⇒ post(u)
for any I. The symbolic override function is defined as follows:
P ⊕ (〈v ← true〉_ u) ≡ v ∧ ((∃v : P )⊕ u),
P ⊕ (〈v ← false〉_ u) ≡ ¬v ∧ ((∃v : P )⊕ u),
P ⊕ (〈〉) ≡ P
where ∃v : P is existential quantification in the logic of quantified boolean
formula (QBF) [AHU74]:
∃v : P , P |v←true ∨ P |v←false
where P |v←true is a restriction operation: restricting v to true in P (i.e.,
replacing v with true in P ). In effect, ∃v : P ignores v in the proposition P .
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The symbolic override operation can have an efficient BDD implementation
with the assignments performed in a single traversal (assuming u is ordered
according to the BDD ordering).
The symbolic version of the reverse transfer function for a guarded update
uses the ignore function defined using following rules:
ignore(〈〉, P ) ≡ P,
ignore(〈v〉_ V,P ) ≡ ignore(V, (∃v : P ))
where V is the sequence of variables assigned in u ordered according to the
BDD ordering. V = variables(u) can be constructed as follows:
variables(〈v ← d〉_ u) = 〈v〉_ variables(u),
variables(〈〉) = 〈〉.
The definition of the reverse transfer function in (2.5) is replaced by:
r(g,u)(O) , ignore(variables(u), O ∧ post(u)) ∧ g. (2.12)
The correctness of (2.12) is slightly more difficult to see than that of (2.11).
O ∧ post(u) characterises the biggest subset of O such that each element
of the subset is a state that can be the result of applying the update u
({t ∈ O | ∃s : t = (s ⊕ u)}). The set of states that can be updated by u
to states in the subset is characterised by ignore(variables(u), O ∧ post(u)).
Finally, of the states that can be updated by u to states in O, only those
satisfying the guard g can transition, thus the conjunction with g.
For an elementary block b, the symbolic version of the forward transfer
function is as follows:
fb(I) ,
∨
(g,u)∈GU(b)
f(g,u)(I) (2.13)
where GU(b) is the set of guarded updates for block b. Similarly, the symbolic
version of the reverse transfer function for b is as follows:
rb(O) ,
∨
(g,u)∈GU(b)
r(g,u)(O). (2.14)
For the overall system defined by a set of elementary blocks B, the symbolic
version of the forward transfer function is defined as follows:
fB(I) ,
∨
b∈B
fb(I). (2.15)
Similarly, the symbolic version of the reverse transfer function for the system
is defined as follows:
rB(O) ,
∨
b∈B
rb(O). (2.16)
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Chapter 3
Computing Reachability
The concept of reachable states is important in model checking. In checking
that a temporal logic formula is satisfied by a model, typically we must show
that particular states in the model are never reached or particular states in
the model are reachable. In general, we must show that the reachable states
satisfy additional temporal properties (or need only show unreachability for
states that satisfy additional temporal properties). Regardless, being able to
distinguish between reachable states and unreachable states is a vital part of
model checking.
Reachability is also important in other types of analysis. As an example,
assuming a system is intended to be non-terminating, deadlocked states can
be characterised as states that are reachable but cannot transition. In the
example BT of Figure 2.1, the states characterised by
(PC1 = 3)∧(PC2 = 1)∧(PC3 = 1)∧(Lock = set)∧(Light = amber) (3.1)
resulting from thread 2 executing N7 while thread 3 is at N10 (and thus
killing thread 3), or thread 3 executing N12 while thread 2 is at N5 (and
thus killing thread 2), are reachable but cannot transition, hence represent
deadlocked states.
A strategically important question in model checking is how and when do
we decide whether or not a state is reachable? A bad strategy can result in
unnecessary state explosion in an intermediate step in the model checking.
The three basic strategies for dealing with reachability are:
1. Precomputing reachability.
2. Checking reachability on-the-fly, e.g., in satisfiability checking or in
searching for a path.
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3. Post-checking of reachability, e.g., after computing “fair states” in LTL
satisfiability checking, to be described in Chapter 4.
The precomputation of reachability can be prohibitively expensive. How-
ever, precomputing reachable states often simplifies the operations required
to perform an analysis. Going back to the example BT of Figure 2.1, if
Reachable(N8) has been computed and characterises the set of reachable
states at the entrance of N8, then performing the following logical operation:
Reachable(N8) ∧ ¬
( ∨
(g,u)∈GU(b)
g
)
immediately yields (3.1). Thus the result of precomputing reachable states
can be used to simplify deadlock analysis. Perhaps more importantly, in the
context of counterexample path generation, precomputing counterexample
states (reachable “fair states”) guarantees the existence of a prefix path to a
counterexample state.
A state is reachable if it is an initial state or there is a transition from
a reachable state to it. A fixpoint characterisation of the set of reachable
states for a system modelled by a set of elementary blocks B is
µZ.S0 ∨ fB(Z) (3.2)
where S0 is a proposition that characterises the set of initial states and fB
is the overall forward transfer function for the system modelled by B. The
fixpoint computation for reachable states can be performed using a single
monolithic transition relation to compute fB(Z). However, it may require a
large BDD to represent a monolithic transition relation. Keeping the forward
transfer functions distributed mitigates this problem. One can go one step
further by computing reachable states at elementary blocks using Algorithm
1 which is inspired by Kildall’s algorithm [Kil73].
Algorithm 1 computes the sets of reachable states at the entrances of
elementary blocks, where choose(W ) chooses an element of W . For each
elementary block b, the resulting reachable states at the entrance of b is
stored in Reachable(b).
Algorithm 1. Compute Reachable States
1. Initialisation:
W ← ∅;
for each b ∈ B do
13
Reachable(b)← S0 ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b));
if Reachable(b) 6= false then W ← W ∪ {b};
2. Iteration:
while W 6= ∅ do
b← choose(W );
W ← W \ {b};
D ← fb(Reachable(b));
for each c ∈ B do
C ← D ∧ (PC(c) = PCval(c));
if ¬(C ⇒ Reachable(c)) then
Reachable(c)← Reachable(c) ∨ C;
W ← W ∪ {c};
Since we deal with finite systems, it is not too difficult to prove the
following theorem:
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 terminates and produces the following result:
∀b ∈ B : Reachable(b)⇔ (µZ.S0 ∨ fB(Z)) ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b)).
Proof. Step 1 in the algorithm iterates over a finite set, so it terminates. Each
iteration in step 2 deletes a block from the working set W and sometimes
adds blocks to W. It only adds a block c to W if the set characterised by
Reachable(c) can be enlarged and enlarges the set in the process. Since the
set characterised by Reachable(c) has a maximum size that is finite, the
addition of a block can only be performed a finite number of times, thus step
2 always terminates.
Let P denote µZ.S0 ∨ fB(Z). We now show that
∀b ∈ B : Reachable(b)⇒ (P ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b)) (3.3)
is an invariant of step 2. Initialisation of Reachable(b) in step 1 guarantees
that the invariant holds on entry to step 2. The only place in step 2 where
Reachable is modified produces
newReachable(c)⇔ Reachable(c)∨(fb(Reachable(b))∧PC(c) = PCval(c)).
Since P is a solution for Z in Z ⇔ (S0 ∨
∨
b∈B fb(Z)),
P ⇔ (S0 ∨
∨
b∈B
fb(P ))
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thus fb(P ) ⇒ P . Since Reachable(b) ⇒ P and fb is monotonic, we have
fb(Reachable(b))⇒ fb(P ) and get
(fb(Reachable(b)) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c))⇒ (P ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c))
and since Reachable(c)⇒ (P ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)), we get
newReachable(c)⇒ (P ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)))
thus proving the invariant (3.3). A second invariant is
∀b, c ∈ B : Reachable(b) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)⇒ Reachable(c). (3.4)
The invariant (3.4) holds after step 1 since
S0 ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b))⇔ Reachable(b) and
S0 ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b)) ∧ (PC(c) = PCval(c))⇒ Reachable(c)
thus Reachable(b) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c) ⇒ Reachable(c). Similarly, in step
2 we have
Reachable(b) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)⇒ Reachable(c),
Reachable(b) ∨ (D ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b)))⇔ newReachable(b) and
D ∧ (PC(b) = PCval(b)) ∧ (PC(c) = PCval(c))⇒ newReachable(c)
thus newReachable(b) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c) ⇒ newReachable(c), meaning
the invariant (3.4) is preserved by each iteration of step 2. Upon termination,
we have for all b, c ∈ B :
fb(Reachable(b)) ∧ PC(c) = PCval(c)⇒ Reachable(c),
whether Reachable(b) was updated (to non-false) last in step 1 or step 2, since
in either case b was put in W , and the processing of b in step 2 guarantees the
condition (whether or not C ⇒ Reachable(c)). In addition, step 1 ensures
that ∀b ∈ B : S0 ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b) ⇒ Reachable(b) (step 2 never makes
the set characterised by Reachable(b) smaller, for any b). Thus we have for
all b ∈ B:
(S0 ∨
∨
d∈B
fd(Reachable(d))) ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b)⇒ Reachable(b).
Invariant (3.4) together with fd(S) = fd(S ∧PC(d) = PCval(d)) guarantees
that fd(Reachable(d)) = fd(
∨
b∈B Reachable(b)). Thus for all b ∈ B:
(S0 ∨ fB(
∨
d∈B
Reachable(d))) ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b)⇒ Reachable(b).
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Since for all d ∈ B we have Reachable(d) ⇒ P and P is a solution for Z in
Z = S0 ∨ fB(Z), we get for all b ∈ B:
P ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b)⇒ Reachable(b). (3.5)
The invariant (3.3) gives us for all b ∈ B:
Reachable(b))⇒ P ∧ PC(b) = PCval(b). (3.6)
Combining (3.5) with (3.6) proves the algorithm produces the desired result.
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Chapter 4
Symbolic LTL Model Checking
4.1 Syntax and Semantics of Temporal Logic
The full propositional temporal logic, called CTL* [EH86], adds path quanti-
fiers and temporal operators to propositional logic. A path in temporal logic
is an infinite sequence of states and a temporal operation describes a prop-
erty on a path. The path quantifiers are A (for all paths) and E (for some
path). The temporal operators are X (“next time”), F (“eventually”), G
(“always”), U (“strong until”) and R (“release”).
There are two types of formulas in CTL*: state formulas (to be inter-
preted as propositions about states) and path formulas (to be interpreted as
propositions about paths).
Definition 1. The syntax of CTL* is inductively defined as follows:
• An atomic proposition is a state formula.
• If f and g are state formulas, then ¬f , f∨g and f∧g are state formulas.
• If f is a path formula, then E f and A f are state formulas.
• If f is a state formula, then f is also a path formula.
• If f and g are path formulas, then ¬f , f ∨ g , f ∧ g, X f , F f , G f ,
f U g and f R g are path formulas.
The propositional operators ¬, ∨ and ∧ are inherited from standard propo-
sitional logic.
Thus all CTL* formulas can be interpreted as path formulas, but some
CTL* formulas cannot be interpreted as state formulas. In fact, a temporal
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operation or a propositional operation with a temporal operation appearing
as a factor (e.g., f ∨ (g ∧ Fh)) can only be interpreted as a path formula.
The semantics of temporal logic is described in terms of a Kripke structure
M = (S,R, L).
Definition 2. A Kripke structure M is a triple (S,R, L) where S is a finite
set of states, R is a relation on S × S called the transition relation, L is a
labelling on S (L : S → P(AP ) where AP is a set of atomic propositions)
and L determines the atomic propositions that hold in each state (p ∈ L(s)
means the atomic proposition p holds in state s). It is generally required that
the transition relation R be total on the left argument (there is a transition
from every state), and S together with R determine the set of paths in M .
The notation M, s |= f is used to indicate that the state formula f
holds in state s in Kripke structure M . The notation M,pi |= f is used
to indicate that the path formula f holds for path pi in Kripke structure M .
The notation pii is used to denote the (i+ 1)th state in path pi (i starts at 0).
The notation pii is used to denote the suffix of pi starting from the ith state,
e.g., pi2 = 〈pi2, pi3, ...〉.
Definition 3. The semantics of CTL* is determined by the |= relation,
inductively defined as follows:
M, s |= p ⇔ p ∈ L(s), if p is an atomic proposition,
M, s |= ¬p ⇔ M, s 6|= p,
M, s |= p ∨ q ⇔ (M, s |= p) ∨ (M, s |= q),
M, s |= p ∧ q ⇔ (M, s |= p) ∧ (M, s |= q),
M, s |= E p ⇔ ∃pi : pi0 = s ∧ (M,pi |= p),
M, s |= A p ⇔ ∀pi : pi0 = s⇒ (M,pi |= p),
M, pi |= p ⇔ M,pi0 |= p, if p is an atomic proposition,
M, pi |= ¬p ⇔ M,pi 6|= p,
M, pi |= p ∨ q ⇔ (M,pi |= p) ∨ (M,pi |= q),
M, pi |= p ∧ q ⇔ (M,pi |= p) ∧ (M,pi |= q),
M, pi |= X p ⇔ M,pi1 |= p,
M, pi |= F p ⇔ ∃i ≥ 0 : (M,pii |= p),
M, pi |= G p ⇔ ∀i ≥ 0 : (M,pii |= p),
M, pi |= pU q ⇔ ∃i ≥ 0 : (M,pii |= q) ∧ ∀0 ≤ j < i : (M,pij |= p),
M, pi |= pR q ⇔ ∀j ≥ 0 : (∀i < j : (M,pii 6|= p))⇒ (M,pij |= q).
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Computation tree logic (CTL) [Eme81] is a fragment of CTL* in which
all temporal operations must be immediately quantified thus producing state
formulas. As a result, one can work entirely with state formulas in pure CTL
model checking.
Linear temporal logic (LTL) [Pnu77] is the path quantifier free fragment
of CTL*. In contrast to CTL, LTL formulas are path formulas, thus LTL
is very much path oriented. This makes LTL model checking more complex
than pure CTL model checking. An LTL formula being model-checked is
implicitly universally quantified over all paths.
In the rest of this technical report, M and M ′ refer to models in the
framework. A model in the framework easily translates to a Kripke structure
as follows:
• S of the model becomes S in the Kripke structure.
• RB ,
⋃
b∈B
⋃
(g,u)∈GU(b)R(g,u) becomes R in the Kripke structure.
• The existence of the labelling L in the Kripke structure is ensured by
requiring atomic propositions to be “decidable” in a state in the model:
i.e., assigning specific values for state variables that occur in an atomic
proposition determines the truth value of the proposition.
Note that although temporal logic is defined only for non-terminating systems
(i.e., R is left-total in the Kripke structure), the framework is neutral with
respect to how to handle termination. Model checking as will be described in
Section 4.3 will work in the presence of deadlock in M , although some care
must be taken in interpreting the result.
4.2 Symbolic Model Checking
Symbolic model checking was originally developed by McMillan [McM92]
for CTL through µ-calculus [Koz83] based on the ideas of Emerson and Lei
[EL86]. Instead of operating on explicit states, symbolic model checking
operates on sets of states characterised by propositions. All state formulas
characterise sets of states. To deal with temporal operations, symbolic CTL
model checking uses fixpoint operations of µ-calculus.
An operation involving a property that is universal along a path (i.e., the
property applies to all suffixes of the path) is computed using the greatest fix-
point operator. For example, the set of states satisfying EGp is characterised
by
νY.p ∧ EXY
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where EXY characterises the set of states each of which can transition to a
state in the set characterised by Y . EXY can be computed in the framework
by applying the reverse transfer function rB to Y .
An operation involving a property that is existential along a path (i.e.,
there exists a suffix of the path where the property applies) is computed
using the least fixpoint operator. For example, the set of states satisfying
E(p U q) is characterised by
µY.q ∨ (p ∧ EXY ).
Pure CTL cannot express many fairness properties. To deal with fairness
within CTL, existing model checkers such as NuSMV allows the addition of
fairness constraints to a model.
Definition 4. A fairness constraint is a state formula (usually restricted
to not containing temporal operations) that holds infinitely often in a path.
Adding fairness constraints to a model means the model is further constrained
by allowing only paths in which each fairness constraint holds infinitely often.
Adding fairness constraints adds complexity to symbolic CTL model
checking, since it may require interaction between nested fixpoint compu-
tations. As an example, the set of states satisfying EGp in the presence of a
finite and non-empty set of fairness constraints C is characterised by
νY.p ∧
∧
c∈C
EX E(p U (Y ∧ c))
≡ νY.p ∧
∧
c∈C
EX (µZ.(Y ∧ c) ∨ (p ∧ EXZ))
where the variable of the outer fixpoint operation (Y ) is in the scope of the
inner fixpoint operation. Intuitively, E(p U (Y ∧ c)) means there exists
a path where p holds globally and Y ∧ c eventually holds, where Y is a
“recursive call” specifying a path satisfying p and
∧
c∈C E(p U (Y ∧ c)), thus
the eventuality of each fairness constraint is repeated indefinitely. In terms
of µ-calculus, fixpoint operations in symbolic CTL model checking in the
presence of fairness constraints are up to a maximum alternation depth of 2.
[BCM+92] describes a method for encoding an LTL satisfiability problem
into a problem that can be handled by a symbolic CTL model checker with
fairness constraints. The method was later revised in [CGH94] and is more
popularly known as the CGH encoding. Section 4.3 generalises the method
by describing a general framework for different encodings of LTL, including
the CGH encoding.
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4.3 LTL Model Checking
This section unifies the concepts used in various LTL encoding schemes and
shows how they can be applied in the framework to produce a symbolic
model checker for LTL. It is motivated by difficulties encountered by Rozier
and Vardi [RV11] in implementing their multi-encoding idea on some of the
existing model checkers. Some of the concepts are implicit in [RV11], but
here they are made more explicit and general.
Section 4.3.1 describes the basic concepts for symbolic LTL model check-
ing. Section 4.3.2 shows how the concepts apply to the promise variable
encoding scheme of [RV11]. Section 4.3.3 shows how they apply to the CGH
encoding scheme. Section 4.3.4 briefly describes how some of the essential
ideas presented can be used to modify the promise variable and CGH encod-
ings to obtain other encodings.
4.3.1 Basic Concepts
An LTL formula p being model checked is implicitly quantified over all paths
in the model, thus is taken to be the CTL* formula Ap. The standard
approach to model checking Ap is using “proof by contradiction” by checking
to see if E¬p is true in the model, i.e., ¬p is satisfiable in the model. Following
standard practice in the literature, this report uses ϕ to denote ¬p.
To illustrate the concepts of this section, suppose the following LTL for-
mula is to be checked against the model for the BT example in Figure 2.1:
GF(Light = green) ∧GF(Light = red). (4.1)
Although, in the model checking, Light = green and Light = red would be
encoded using BDD variables, for readability they are kept as equalities here.
Thus we have:
ϕ ≡ FG(¬(Light = green)) ∨ FG(¬(Light = red)). (4.2)
Symbolic model checking operates on characterisations of sets of states.
However, LTL is path oriented. To deal with path properties in a state
setting, one must work with augmented states where the model’s states are
augmented with path modalities based on ϕ. The path modalities in an
augmented state may be viewed as commitments to certain classes of paths,
thus there are transition constraints associated with the modalities. The path
modalities together with the transition constraints become what is called the
tableau for ϕ.
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Augmenting states of a model M with modalities and adding transition
constraints based on the modalities result in an augmented model M ′. Tra-
ditionally, the augmented model has been described as the product of the
Kripke structure for the tableau for ϕ and the Kripke structure for the model
(see [CGH94]). However, it may be preferable to view the augmented model
M ′ as the result of superimposing the tableau for ϕ on the original model M .
This viewpoint has an important practical consequence: one can arrive at
the augmented model by adding state variables representing the modalities
to the original model and adding rules to the transitions.
The idea behind constructing an augmented model M ′ is to ensure all
relevant cases — in the form of (augmented) paths — are considered, in the
satisfiability check of ϕ. However, the augmented model does not guarantee
that only relevant paths are considered. The augmented model may allow
paths in which eventualities in ϕ are never fulfilled. To ensure that only
relevant paths are considered, the eventualities must be checked.
There are different ways of producing a tableau for ϕ resulting, in gen-
eral, in different tableaux for the same ϕ. There are also different ways of
checking eventualities. The tableau generation and the checking of eventual-
ities are intertwined, thus they are not completely independent. Collectively,
how a tableau is produced and eventualities are checked is called an encod-
ing scheme. In general, an encoding scheme will include a normalisation
procedure for ϕ, applied at the start of the encoding process.
An encoding scheme for the satisfiability checking of ϕ is determined by
the following:
• the set of primitive temporal operators that may appear in a normalised
ϕ (the full set of temporal operators or a reduced set),
• whether negations are pushed inside temporal operations in the nor-
malisation of ϕ,
• how transition constraints are produced, and
• how eventualities are encoded.
The choices are not independent, e.g., if negations are pushed inside temporal
operations, then the dual of a primitive temporal operator must also be
primitive.
In addition to the above concepts, the following are common to all en-
coding schemes:
• el(ϕ) - elementary formulas of ϕ. Each elementary formula is a path
formula, and each elementary formula is assigned a Boolean state vari-
able in the augmented model M ′. Let V (p) denote the Boolean state
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variable for an elementary formula p. A value of true for V (p) in an
augmented state s is a commitment for s to only start (suffix) paths
that satisfy p. In a strict encoding, a value of false for V (p) in an
augmented state s is a commitment for s to only start (suffix) paths
that satisfy ¬p. The set of elementary formulas el(ϕ) for ϕ depends on
the encoding as well as ϕ.
• Sϕ(p) - transition constraint for p. Intuitively, Sϕ(p) characterises the
set of transitions that can start paths that satisfy the path formula p.
How Sϕ(p) is computed depends on the encoding scheme.
• Cϕ - the set of fairness constraints for ϕ. Each fairness constraint must
hold infinitely often in a fair path. The set depends on the encoding
scheme as well as ϕ.
• Fϕ - characterises the set of fair states for ϕ.
The concept of elementary formulas here is slightly different from [BCM+92]
and follows that of [RV11] in that it does not include atomic propositions.
This is because atomic propositions are assumed to be already represented
using state variables in the original model.
4.3.2 Promise Variable Encoding
The promise variable encoding of [RV11] uses the full set of temporal op-
erators as primitive operators. During normalisation, negations are pushed
inside temporal operations using the following rules:
¬Xp ≡ X¬p,
¬Gp ≡ F¬p,
¬Fp ≡ G¬p,
¬(p U q) ≡ ¬p R ¬q,
¬(p R q) ≡ ¬p U ¬q,
and pushed inside propositional connectives using the rules of propositional
logic, producing a negation normal form (NNF). Assuming ϕ has been nor-
malised, the rules for computing el(ϕ) for the promise variable encoding are
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as follows:
el(p) = {}, if p ∈ APϕ,
el(¬p) = el(p),
el(p ∧ q) = el(p) ∪ el(q),
el(p ∨ q) = el(p) ∪ el(q),
el(Xp) = el(p),
el(pU q) = {pU q} ∪ el(p) ∪ el(q),
el(pR q) = {pR q} ∪ el(p) ∪ el(q),
el(GFp) = {GFp} ∪ el(p),
el(Gp) = {Gp} ∪ el(p), if p 6= Fq for any q, and
el(Fp) = {Fp} ∪ el(p).
In addition, ϕ is added to el(ϕ) (i.e., ϕ ∈ el(ϕ)). Thus the set of elementary
formulas for ϕ of (4.2) (which is already in negation normal form) is
el(ϕ) =
{
FG(¬(Light = green)) ∨ FG(¬(Light = red)),
FG(¬(Light = green)), G(¬(Light = green)),
FG(¬(Light = red)), G(¬(Light = red))}.
Each of the elementary formulas is encoded as a Boolean state variable. Let
V (p) denote the Boolean state variable encoding p if p is an elementary
formula or p is an atomic formula. Five boolean state variables v1, ..., v5 are
added to become part of M ′:
v1 = V (FG(¬(Light = green)) ∨ FG(¬(Light = red))),
v2 = V (FG(¬(Light = green))),
v3 = V (G(¬(Light = green))),
v4 = V (FG(¬(Light = red))), and
v5 = V (G(¬(Light = red))).
Eventualities are directly encoded using promise variables which are also
Boolean state variables. When a promise variable has the value true in
an augmented state s, it means the corresponding eventuality has yet to
be fulfilled in all subpaths that start with s. A value of false means the
eventuality has been fulfilled. The fulfillment occurs “passively” because
transition constraints can assert that a promise variable has the value true
but cannot assert that the variable has the value false. Instead, the existence
of states that fulfill the eventuality is inferred from ensuring that such states
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do not contradict the transition constraints. Each elementary formula that is
a temporal operation with an eventuality (a formula of the form pU q, Fp or
GFp) is assigned a promise variable. Let P (p) denote the promise variable
for a path formula p of the form above. Two promise variables p1, p2 are
added to become part of M ′:
p1 = P (FG(¬(Light = green))), and
p2 = P (FG(¬(Light = red))).
The transition constraints are based on the values of the variables for elemen-
tary formulas and use a generalisation of the idea of sat sets from [CGH94].
Intuitively, Sϕ(p) characterises the set of transitions that can start paths
that satisfy the path formula p. For the promise variable encoding, Sϕ(p) is
computed using the following rules:
Sϕ(p) ≡ V (p), if p ∈ AP (ϕ),
Sϕ(¬p) ≡ ¬Sϕ(p),
Sϕ(p ∧ q) ≡ Sϕ(p) ∧ Sϕ(q),
Sϕ(p ∨ q) ≡ Sϕ(p) ∨ Sϕ(q),
Sϕ(Xp) ≡ next(V (p)), if p ∈ el(ϕ),
Sϕ(Xp) ≡ next(Sϕ(p)), if p 6∈ el(ϕ),
Sϕ(pU q) ≡ Sϕ(q) ∨ (Sϕ(p) ∧ P (pU q) ∧ next(V (pU q))),
Sϕ(pR q) ≡ Sϕ(q) ∧ (Sϕ(p) ∨ next(V (pR q))),
Sϕ(Gp) ≡ Sϕ(p) ∧ next(V (Gp)), if p 6= Fq for any q,
Sϕ(Fp) ≡ Sϕ(p) ∨ (P (Fp) ∧ next(V (Fp))), and
Sϕ(GFp) ≡ next(V (GFp)) ∧ (Sϕ(p) ∨ P (GFp)),
where AP (ϕ) is the set of atomic subformulas of ϕ, V (p) denotes the BDD
variable encoding p, P (p) denotes the promise variable for p, and next(p) is
a constraint stating that p holds in the next state.
For each p ∈ el(ϕ), if V (p) holds in a state s, then there can be a transition
from s to a state t only if Sϕ(p) is satisfied by the transition from s to t. If the
encoding is strict, the converse also applies: if ¬V (p) holds in s, then there
can be a transition from s to t only if ¬Sϕ(p) is satisfied by the transition
from s to t. An encoding scheme that uses a negation normal form need not
be strict, since the satisfiability of ϕ never relies on ¬V (p), for any elementary
formula p.
Conceptually, a tableau partitions a transition based on combinations
of the state variables for elementary formulas. There are 2n combinations,
where n is the number of state variables for elementary formulas (n = 5 for
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the example). As an example, if a non-strict encoding is used (called sloppy
encoding in [RV11]), then for the combination ¬v1∧¬v2∧v3∧v4∧¬v5, since
v3 encodes G(¬(Light = green)) and v4 encodes FG(¬(Light = red)), the
transition constraint is
Sϕ(G(¬(Light = green))) ∧ Sϕ(FG(¬(Light = red))),
which, when expanded using the rules for Sϕ (but with Light = green and
Light = red left unexpanded for readability), and simplified using proposi-
tional logic, produces
¬(Light = green) ∧ next(v3) ∧ ¬(Light = red) ∧ next(v5) ∨
¬(Light = green) ∧ next(v3) ∧ p2 ∧ next(v4),
which has two cases. Each case is separated into a “from” constraint fc and a
“to” constraint tc based on next. Factors that do not involve next are added
to fc along with the combination itself (¬v1∧¬v2∧ v3∧ v4∧¬v5). Each next
factor is added to tc after stripping off the next. For the second case of the
above example, i.e.,
¬(Light = green) ∧ next(v3) ∧ p2 ∧ next(v4),
the fc and tc are as follows:
fc ≡ ¬v1 ∧ ¬v2 ∧ v3 ∧ v4 ∧ ¬v5 ∧ ¬(Light = green) ∧ p2,
tc ≡ v3 ∧ v4.
A combination whose “to” or “from” constraint reduces to false can be
ignored. In addition, cases may be merged.
In the framework, the transition constraints are used to modify trans-
fer functions in the original model M to become transfer functions in the
augmented model M ′ as follows:
f ′b(I) ,
∨
i∈Idx
fb(ignore(xvars(ϕ), I ∧ fci)) ∧ tci, (4.3)
r′b(O) ,
∨
i∈Idx
rb(ignore(xvars(ϕ), O ∧ tci)) ∧ fci, (4.4)
where Idx is the set of indices for the tableau cases and xvars(ϕ) is the
sequence of Boolean state variables added to arrive at M ′ (ordered according
to the BDD ordering).
M ′ only handles one aspect of the satisfiability checking: that of ensuring
all relevant paths are considered. To ensure that only relevant paths are
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considered, eventualities must be checked. This is handled by computing
the set of “fair” states, defined with respect to fairness constraints. For the
promise variable encoding, the set of fairness constraints is defined as follows:
Cϕ , {¬v | v is a promise variable}.
For the example, Cϕ = {¬p1,¬p2}.
An augmented state is said to be fair with respect to ϕ if it can start a
path in which each of the fairness constraints in Cϕ is satisfied infinitely often.
The set of such augmented states has the following fixpoint characterisation:
Fϕ , νZ.
∧
c∈Cϕ
EX(µY.(Z ∧ c) ∨ EXY ). (4.5)
where EXp characterises states each of which can transition to a state in the
set characterised by p, i.e., conceptually EXp ≡ r′B(p). However, the actual
computation of EXp can distributed among the elementary blocks using r′b
for each elementary block b. Equation (4.5) applies to all encoding schemes.
Theorem 2. An LTL formula ϕ is satisfiable in the underlying unaugmented
model M if and only if Fϕ ∧ Sϕ(ϕ) ∧ S0 is not false.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 2 in [CGH94], where the theorem is stated in
a product Kripke structure setting and the encoding is CGH. The proof needs
to be adjusted for different encodings but otherwise has a similar structure.
Since ϕ is the negation of the LTL formula model checked, Fϕ∧Sϕ(ϕ)∧S0
characterises the set of states that can start counterexample paths, hence the
following definition
Definition 5. ICϕ defined as
ICϕ , Fϕ ∧ Sϕ(ϕ) ∧ S0
characterises the set of initial counterexample states.
4.3.3 CGH Encoding
The CGH encoding [CGH94] uses a minimal set of primitive temporal oper-
ators: {X,U}. The use of a minimal set is made possible by not requiring
a negation normal form, thus not requiring the dual of U, i.e., R, to be
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primitive. Temporal operations involving operators other than X and U are
converted using the following rules during normalisation:
Fp ≡ true U p,
Gp ≡ ¬(true U ¬p), and
p R q ≡ ¬(¬p U ¬q).
For the example (4.1), the resulting normalised ϕ is as follows:
ϕ ≡ (true U ¬(true U (Light = green))) ∨
(true U ¬(true U (Light = red))).
Once ϕ has been normalised, el(ϕ) is computed using the following rules:
el(p) = {}, if p ∈ APϕ,
el(¬p) = el(p),
el(p ∧ q) = el(p) ∪ el(q),
el(p ∨ q) = el(p) ∪ el(q),
el(Xp) = {Xp} ∪ el(p), and
el(pU q) = {X(pU q)} ∪ el(p) ∪ el(q).
For the example, we have
el(ϕ) =
{
X(true U ¬(true U (Light = green))),
X(true U (Light = green)),
X(true U ¬(true U (Light = red))),
X(true U (Light = red))
}
.
Thus 4 boolean state variables are used to encode the elementary formulas:
v1 = V (X(true U ¬(true U (Light = green)))),
v2 = V (X(true U (Light = green))),
v3 = V (X(true U ¬(true U (Light = red)))), and
v4 = V (X(true U (Light = red))).
For convenience, let us use g1, g2, g3 and g4 to denote the arguments of the
X formulas, thus
g1 ≡ (true U ¬(true U (Light = green))),
g2 ≡ (true U (Light = green)),
g3 ≡ (true U ¬(true U (Light = red))), and
g4 ≡ (true U (Light = red)).
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Sϕ(p) is computed using the following rules:
Sϕ(Xp) ≡ next(Sauxϕ(p)),
Sauxϕ(p) ≡ V (p), if p ∈ el(ϕ) ∪ AP (ϕ),
Sauxϕ(¬p) ≡ ¬Sauxϕ(p),
Sauxϕ(p ∧ q) ≡ Sauxϕ(p) ∧ Sauxϕ(q),
Sauxϕ(p ∨ q) ≡ Sauxϕ(p) ∨ Sauxϕ(q), and
Sauxϕ(pU q) ≡ Sauxϕ(q) ∨ (Sauxϕ(p) ∧ Sauxϕ(X(pU q))),
For each p ∈ el(ϕ), if V (p) holds in a state s, then there can be a transition
from s to a state t only if Sϕ(p) is satisfied by the transition from s to t. Since
the CGH encoding scheme does not use a negation normal form, it must be
strict, thus the converse also applies: if ¬V (p) holds in s, then there can be
a transition from s to t only if ¬Sϕ(p) is satisfied by the transition from s
to t. As an example, for the combination ¬v1 ∧ v2 ∧ ¬v3 ∧ v4, the transition
constraints are:
fc ≡ ¬v1 ∧ v2 ∧ ¬v3 ∧ v4,
tc ≡ ¬Sϕ(g1) ∧ Sϕ(g2) ∧ ¬Sϕ(g3) ∧ Sϕ(g4)
≡ ¬v1 ∧ ((Light = green) ∨ v2) ∧ ¬v3 ∧ ((Light = red) ∨ v4).
The transition constraints are used to modify the transfer functions as in
(4.3) and (4.4).
For the CGH encoding, each subformula of ϕ of the form pU q gives rise
to a fairness constraint Sauxϕ(¬(pU q) ∨ q), i.e.,
Cϕ , {Sauxϕ(¬(pU q) ∨ q)
∣∣ pU q ∈ sub(ϕ)}
where sub(ϕ) is the set of subformulas of ϕ. For the example, there are 4
subformulas of the form pU q: g1, g2, g3 and g4. Thus we have 4 fairness
constraints:
c1 ≡ Sauxϕ(¬g1 ∨ ¬g2)
≡ (((Light = green) ∨ v2) ∧ ¬v1) ∨ (¬(Light = green) ∧ ¬v2),
c2 ≡ Sauxϕ(¬g2 ∨ ¬(Light = green))
≡ ¬(Light = green),
c3 ≡ Sauxϕ(¬g3 ∨ ¬g4)
≡ (((Light = red) ∨ v4) ∧ ¬v3) ∨ (¬(Light = red) ∧ ¬v4), and
c4 ≡ Sauxϕ(¬g4 ∨ ¬(Light = red))
≡ ¬(Light = red),
and Cϕ = {c1, c2, c3, c4}. The characterisation of the set of fairness con-
straints Fϕ is computed using (4.5).
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4.3.4 Other Encodings
The promise variable encoding and the CGH encoding described are at the
opposite corners of a two-dimensional spectrum of encoding schemes. Since
M ′ together with the checking of fairness constraints form what is essentially
a Generalised Bu¨chi Automaton (GBA), the encoding schemes may be viewed
as LTL-to-GBA encoding schemes. A variation of the promise variable en-
coding scheme is to have a reduced set of primitive operators {X,U,R}. The
rules for el(ϕ), Sϕ and promise variables can still be used, but some of them
are never applied. Similarly, there can be several variations of the CGH en-
coding scheme that use the negation normal form (thus having larger sets of
primitive operators than {X,U}). Additional rules for el(ϕ), Sϕ and possi-
bly fairness constraints are needed for the CGH variants. Another dimension
in an encoding scheme where negation normal form is used is whether the
encoding is strict or loose (sloppy in [RV11]).
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Chapter 5
Controlled Generation of
Counterexample Paths
This chapter describes a mechanism to direct the search for a counterexample
path as part of controlling the generation of counterexample paths. The
mechanism is invoked with two parameters:
• SR - characterising a set of fair (with respect to ϕ) states, through
which the cycle part of the generated counterexample path must pass.
• gc - a proposition without temporal operations (thus a state formula)
that represents a global constraint (must be satisfied by all states in
the counterexample path).
In the search for a counterexample path, the mechanism may narrow SR.
In addition, gc may be specified as true, which means there is no global
constraint.
It has become standard practice in model checking to focus on counterex-
ample paths of the form p · sω, where the prefix p is a possibly null finite
sequence of states and the suffix s is a non-null finite sequence of states,
and s is repeated forever (thus s is called the cycle part). Although other
counterexamples are possible, counterexamples of the form p · sω are in some
sense the smallest representative counterexamples.
Since symbolic techniques operate on sets of states, it is convenient to
work with sequences of sets of states instead. In the proposed approach, a
symbolic counterexample path is defined by a triple:
(Ipi, ppi, spi)
where Ipi characterises a set of initial states, and prefix ppi and suffix spi are
finite sequences of transitions. Any state in Ipi, by following the sequence
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of transitions ppi · sωpi , generates a counterexample path, where a transition
corresponds to an elementary block. Alternatively, the initial set may be
viewed as generating a counterexample path at an abstract level, where sets
of states in the path are viewed as symbolic states. In either case, the focus
is on the (infinite) sequence of transitions.
The basic strategy in the search for a counterexample path is as follows:
• Find a cycle in which all fairness constraints are fulfilled and which
visits the symbolic state SR. The sequence of transitions of the cycle
found becomes spi.
• If a state in the cycle is reachable (from a state in the set of initial
counterexample states), then a prefix ppi can be found that determines
Ipi and completes the counterexample path.
Precomputing reachability of states allows a cycle to be searched on reachable
states, guaranteeing the existence of a prefix to any cycle found. Otherwise
a prefix for a cycle found might not exist.
Recall from Section 4.3.2 that the characterisation ICϕ of the set of initial
counterexample states is as follows:
ICϕ , Fϕ ∧ Sϕ(ϕ) ∧ S0. (5.1)
Counterexample states are fair states that are reachable from ICϕ , thus the
set of counterexample states FCϕ can be characterised as follows:
FCϕ , µZ . ICϕ ∨ f ′′B(Z), (5.2)
where f ′′B is defined as follows:
f ′′B(I) , f ′B(I ∧ Fϕ) ∧ Fϕ.
In the presence of a global constraint gc, the transfer functions have to
be further revised. The revised forward and reverse transfer functions are
defined as follows:
f ′′′B (I) , f ′B(I ∧ Fϕ ∧ gc) ∧ Fϕ ∧ gc, (5.3)
r′′′B(O) , r′B(O ∧ FCϕ ∧ gc) ∧ FCϕ ∧ gc. (5.4)
The set of counterexample states in the presence of a global constraint gc is
defined as follows:
FCgcϕ , µZ . (ICϕ ∧ gc) ∨ f ′′′B (Z), (5.5)
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5.1 Cycle Search
The cycle search here uses partitions at each step to precisely track which
fairness constraints are fulfilled along the path to SR. Because 2
k partitions
are needed at each step where k is the number of fairness constraints, the cycle
search presented here is only feasible if the number of fairness constraints is
not too large. For large k, a less precise tracking of fairness constraints can
be used, possibly resulting in longer cycles.
There are two phases in the search for a cycle. The first phase is a
backward search from a reference set of states SR for a set of states, each of
which can reach a state in SR in a finite number of transitions, say n, and the
transitions fulfill all the fairness constraints, and the set itself contains SR.
The second phase searches forward from the found set for a cycle of length
n. Note that n itself is found rather than fixed before the search.
The search in phase 1 is performed in steps: step 1 searches the set
of counterexample states that can reach SR in exactly one transition, step
2 searches the set of counterexample states that can reach SR in exactly
2 transitions, and so on, and at each step, the set of states is partitioned
according to the combination of fairness constraints that are fulfilled along
the path to SR. The search succeeds if it reaches a step n in which the
partition where all fairness constraints are fulfilled contains SR.
Let us denote the characterisation of the set of counterexample states
that can reach SR in exactly i steps, Si, where i ≥ 1. Thus we have
S1 ≡ r′′′B(SR), and
Si ≡ r′′′B(Si−1) for i > 1.
At each step, the set of states is partitioned according to the combination
of fairness constraints that are fulfilled along the path to SR. Let us denote
the set of all combinations Combϕ. For the example where Cϕ = {c1, c2},
Combϕ = {(¬c1,¬c2), (¬c1, c2), (c1,¬c2), (c1, c2)} (where c1 ≡ ¬p1 and c2 ≡
¬p2), producing 4 partitions. The partitions for step i are computed based
on the fairness constraints that are fulfilled in the states and the partitions
in step i − 1 to which the states can transition. Let Pi(comb) denote the
partition for step i for the combination comb.
Pi(comb) , Si∧
(
prop(comb)∨
∨
cmb∈target(comb)
δ(comb, cmb)∧r′′′B(Pi−1(cmb))
)
,
where prop(comb) is the proposition that arises from the combination comb
(e.g., prop((¬c1, c2)) ≡ ¬c1 ∧ c2 ≡ p1 ∧ ¬p2); target(comb) gives the set of
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combinations that can be the target of comb:
target(comb) ,
{cmb ∈ Combϕ | ∀c ∈ Cϕ : (prop(comb)⇒ ¬c)⇒ (prop(cmb)⇒ ¬c)},
i.e., if a fairness constraint occurs negatively in comb, then it must also occur
negatively in each of the combinations in target(comb); and δ(comb, cmb)
is the conjunction of fairness constraints that occur positively in comb and
negatively in cmb:
δ(comb, cmb) ,
∧
c∈{c∈Cϕ | (prop(comb)⇒c)∧(prop(cmb)⇒¬c)}
c.
As an example,
Pi((c1, c2)) ≡ Si ∧ c1 ∧ c2 ∨
Si ∧ c1 ∧ c2 ∧ r′′′B(Pi−1((¬c1,¬c2))) ∨
Si ∧ c1 ∧ r′′′B(Pi−1((¬c1, c2))) ∨
Si ∧ c2 ∧ r′′′B(Pi−1((c1,¬c2))) ∨
Si ∧ r′′′B(Pi−1((c1, c2)))
≡ Si ∧ c1 ∧ c2 ∨
Si ∧ c1 ∧ r′′′B(Pi−1((¬c1, c2))) ∨
Si ∧ c2 ∧ r′′′B(Pi−1((c1,¬c2))) ∨
Si ∧ r′′′B(Pi−1((c1, c2))).
Phase 1 terminates with success if at some step n, the partition for the
combination where all the fairness constraints occur positively (Pn((c1, c2))
for the example) contains SR ((SR ∧ Pn((c1, c2))) ≡ SR for the example).
Phase 2 chooses and verifies a cycle. Each choice point is associated with
a step i from phase 1 and is represented by a pair consisting of a set of states
characterised by SSi and a partition characterised by PPi. It starts from
step n with SSn = SR and PPn the partition in phase 1 for step n for the
combination where all the fairness constraints occur positively:
PPn = Pn(cmb) where cmb ∈ Combϕ ∧ (∀c ∈ Cϕ : prop(cmb)⇒ c)
(PPn = Pn((c1, c2)) for the example), and proceeds forward in the direction
opposite of phase 1. At each step i (where i goes from n to 1), it chooses a
transition (an elementary block) bi and a combination cmbi−1 to determine
the next partition PPi−1 = Pi−1(cmbi−1). The transition and the next parti-
tion must “match” SSi and PPi, in that any difference between combinations
of the partitions must be accounted:
SSi−1 ≡ (f ′′bi(SSi ∧ δ(PPi, cmbi−1)) ∧ Pi−1(cmbi−1)) 6≡ false.
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For example, to choose elementary block bn and the combination (¬c1, c2)
resulting in PPn−1 ≡ Pn−1((¬c1, c2)) for step n, the following must hold:
SSn−1 ≡ (f ′′bn(SSn ∧ c1) ∧ Pn−1((¬c1, c2))) 6≡ false.
The process is repeated until SS0 is obtained. Note that for “step 0,” the
reference set of states is partitioned according to the combination of fairness
constraints that are fulfilled in the states:
∀cmb ∈ Combϕ : (P0(cmb) ≡ (SR ∧ prop(cmb))).
Phase 2 backtracks to a previous step if it fails to find a matching choice at
a step.
Once SS0 is obtained, the cycle still needs to be verified. This is per-
formed by narrowing SSi for i = 1, ..., n so that SSi−1 ≡ f ′′bi(SSi) and
SSi ≡ r′′′bi (SSi−1), and checking to ensure that SS0 ≡ SSn, i.e., all states
in the cycle must be able to transition and remain in the cycle. In general,
the set characterised by the resulting SS0 ≡ SSn is a subset of the original
goal set of counterexample states characterised by SR.
Theorem 3. The result of a successful phase 1 guarantees that there is a
cycle of length kn for some k ≥ 1.
Proof. For any SSn such that false 6≡ SSn and (SSn ∧ SR) ≡ SSn (i.e.,
the set characterised by SSn is a non-empty subset of SR), there exists a
sequence of choices of length n as in phase 2, producing SS0 where false 6≡
SS0 and (SS0 ∧ SR) ≡ SS0. This process can be repeated indefinitely with
SS0 becoming the new SSn at each iteration, and since the system is finite,
eventually a cycle will be found whose length is a multiple k of n where
k ≥ 1.
The result of phase 1 does not guarantee that a cycle of length n can
be found, although in practice, it often results in phase 2 finding a cycle of
length n. If a cycle of length n cannot be found in phase 2, there are several
alternatives for proceeding. One alternative is to modify phase 2 to continue
searching for a cycle of length a multiple of n. Another alternative is to
“resume” phase 1 at step n + 1 as though the appropriate partition in step
n (Pn((c1, c2)) in the example) does not produce a desired result (i.e., does
not contain SR), in the hope that a cycle of length less than 2n is found.
There is a variation of phase 1 where, if at some step i it finds that the
partition for the combination where all fairness constraints occur positively
— i.e., Pi(cmb) where ∀c ∈ Cϕ : prop(cmb) ⇒ c — “almost matches” SR in
that Pi(cmb) does not contain SR but the intersection of Pi(cmb) and SR is
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not empty (i.e., (SR∧Pi(cmb)) 6≡ SR and (SR∧Pi(cmb)) 6≡ false), then phase
1 is restarted with the intersection becoming the new reference set (SR ∧ P
becomes the new SR). This variation tends to produce the smallest n.
5.2 Choosing a Prefix
Once a cycle is found, finding a prefix that leads to the cycle is straightfor-
ward. From SS0, a backward search can be performed much like phase 1
of the cycle search, but without any concern for fairness constraints (thus
no need for partitioning), until initial counterexample states are found. For
each step i in the backward search, let SPi denote the characterisation of the
set of counterexample states that can reach SS0 in exactly i steps. Thus
SP1 ≡ r′′′B(SS0), and
SPi ≡ r′′′B(SPi−1) for i > 1.
If reachability is precomputed, then the cycle found is reachable from ICϕ∧gc,
and this backward search will succeed in a finite number of steps m which is
the length of the shortest prefix to the cycle:
∀i < m : (SPi ∧ ICϕ ∧ gc) ≡ false,
(SPm ∧ ICϕ ∧ gc) 6≡ false.
Otherwise there is no guarantee that the backward search will succeed. To
safely prevent non-termination, check the result of step i and terminate with
failure if it is identical to the result of a previous step j (SPi ≡ SPj, i > j >
0). Since the model is finite, the addition of the check guarantees termination.
It is safe termination since if there is m > i where (SPm ∧ ICϕ ∧ gc) 6≡ false,
there would have been a k where j < k ≤ i and SPk ≡ SPm.
Much like phase 2 of the cycle search, again without any concern for
fairness constraints, a prefix can be chosen that starts from a subset of the
set characterised by SPm ∧ ICϕ ∧ gc. The set of initial counterexample states
found is possibly narrowed when choosing a prefix, and it becomes Ipi in
the counterexample path triple; the prefix (a sequence of transitions) chosen
becomes ppi; and the cycle (a sequence of transitions of length n) becomes spi.
Note that although the chosen prefix may further narrow the set of states
on entry to the cycle (characterised by SS0), the cycle spi as a sequence of
transitions is still valid.
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5.3 Strategies
5.3.1 Termination Strategies
Phase 1 of the cycle search as described in Section 5.1 may not terminate.
There are several ways of dealing with this problem, including:
• In phase 1, when the partitions for a step i are identical to the partitions
for an earlier step j, where i > j > 0, then terminate the phase with
failure.
• Set an upper bound max on the number of transitions in a cycle. In
some cases we may be able to guarantee that there are no cycles if
phase 1 has not found a starting point within max steps.
The first way is guaranteed to prevent non-termination safely (i.e., without
failing when in fact there is a cycle), but the check can be expensive. The
second way may be a more efficient check, but in general there is no guarantee
that termination is safe. A compromise between the two would be to check
partitions every max number of steps, which will guarantee safe termination,
but does not necessarily detect failure as early as possible.
5.3.2 Reachability Strategies
Precomputing FCgcϕ as defined in (5.5) guarantees that a cycle found using
the techniques of Section 5.1 is reachable from ICϕ ∧ gc, and a prefix to the
cycle is guaranteed to be found using the techniques of Section 5.2. Algorithm
1 can be used to compute FCgcϕ, with ICϕ∧gc replacing S0 and f ′′′b replacing fb
for each elementary block b. However, there are cases where the computation
of FCgcϕ is several orders of magnitude slower than the LTL checking.
An alternative would be to defer the reachability computation. Cycle
searching can be perfomed on Fϕ (characterising the set of fair states) in-
stead. However, a cycle found this way is not guaranteed to be valid since
it is not guaranteed to be reachable. A compromise approach would be to
compute and perform the search in FCϕ (usually computing FCϕ is slower
than computing FCgcϕ, but need only be performed once). The compromise
approach also does not guarantee that a cycle found is reachable.
Yet another approach would be to start with SR in Fϕ or FCϕ but imme-
diately try to find a subset of SR that is reachable from ICϕ ∧ gc using f ′′′B .
If it can be found, the subset can replace SR and a cycle found from the new
SR is guaranteed to be reachable from ICϕ ∧ gc.
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5.3.3 Using the Mechanism
The previous sections did not explain how one ought to specify SR in directing
the search. To make the directed search feasible, it is advisable to specify SR
such that all states in SR are at the same execution point, i.e., all PCs have
their values fixed. Since it would be unreasonable to expect a user to specify
all the PC values when there is a large number of PCs, a good compromise
is to make the user fix the value of one of the PCs. This corresponds to
fixing the execution point for one of the threads. An implementation of the
interface would then automatically go through all possible combinations of
the other PC values until a combination is found that leads to a successful
search for a cycle.
A possible implementation of the interface is as follows. When a user
fixes PCi = vali, SR is initially set to F ∧ PCi = vali, where F is Fϕ, FCϕ,
or FCgcϕ depending on the reachability strategy used. Incrementally fix each
of the other PCs PCj by iterating over the values of PCj:
• Test each possible value valj of PCj.
• If SR ∧ PCj = valj is not false then set SR ← (SR ∧ PCj = valj) and
continue with the next PC; if there is none then we have SR with the
values of all PCs fixed and proceed to the cycle search, and this becomes
a resumption point to try other combinations if the cycle search fails.
• If SR ∧ PCj = valj is false then try the next value for PCj. If there
are no other values then backtrack to the previous PC; if there is none
then terminate with failure.
The interface described above has been implemented in a prototype. For
the example (4.1), when the prototype was asked to find a counterexam-
ple path whose cycle goes through BT node N7 (i.e., PC2 = 4), using the
reachability strategy where FCϕ is computed first, it found a symbolic coun-
terexample path with
Ipi ≡ (PC1 = 1) ∧ (PC2 = 0) ∧ (PC3 = 0) ∧ ¬e2 ∧ ¬e3 ∧ e1 ∧
(¬(Light = red) ∨ e4) ∧ (¬(Light = red) ∨ p2)
ppi = 〈N1,N2,N3/N4,N5,N6〉, and
spi = 〈N7,N3/N4,N5,N6〉.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary
A general framework for symbolic LTL model checking has been presented
that allows different LTL encoding schemes and different strategies to be
used. The use of guarded updates and transfer functions in the framework
simplifies the operations required for reachability, model checking and coun-
terexample path generation (compared to Kripke structures and relational
products). Elementary blocks make the bidirectional mapping between the
source notation and the representation of the model apparent.
Allowing different encodings and strategies can result in more efficient
(faster) model checking:
• If a problem belongs to a class with a known best combination of en-
coding and strategy, the the model checker can be run with that com-
bination.
• If there is no known best combination for a problem, several model
checkers — each with a specific combination of encoding and strategy
— can be run in parallel for that problem.
A mechanism for a controlled generation of counterexample paths has
also been presented. A symbolic counterexample path is searched starting
with the search for a cycle that includes a reference set of states. A prefix
to the cycle is searched afterwards. A global constraint may be added to
further constrain the search space. The approach works well if the set of
counterexample states is computed first. If the set of counterexample states
is not computed and the set of fair states is used instead, then heuristics may
need to be developed to quickly find a reachable subset of a set of fair states,
otherwise the search space can easily become too large.
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